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Abstract
There is little consensus regarding the circumstances in which people spontaneously generate causal inferences, and in particular
whether they generate inferences about the causal antecedents or the causal consequences of events. We tested whether people systemati-
cally infer causal antecedents or causal consequences to minimal social scenarios by using a continuation methodology. People over-
whelmingly produced causal antecedent continuations for descriptions of interpersonal events (John hugged Mary), but causal
consequence continuations to descriptions of transfer events (John gave a book to Mary). This demonstrates that there is no global cogni-
tive style, but rather inference generation is crucially tied to the input. Further studies examined the role of event unusualness, number of
participators, and verb-type on the likelihood of producing a causal antecedent or causal consequence inference. We conclude that infer-
ences are critically guided by the speciWc verb used.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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social world, and it is a basic assumption of various theo-
ries of causal attribution that people seek explanations of
social acts (e.g., Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1989; Hilton &
Slugoski, 1986; Kelley, 1967). In social psychology, much of
the literature on attribution shows that causal inferences
are frequently made under diverse circumstances, a Wnding
that presupposes that causal questions are being asked
under diverse circumstances. Similarly, in the adult lan-
guage comprehension literature, it has been suggested that
events not given explicit explanations in discourse lead to
people seeking an explanation, possibly by asking a causal
 We thank Sandie Cleland, Jamie Pearson and Mitch Wells for assis-
tance with running experiments and coding, and Kate Cavanagh, John
Skowronski and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments
on earlier versions of this paper.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Asifa.Majid@mpi.nl (A. Majid).0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.10.016question (Turnbull, 1986). All of this evidence is consistent
with the claim that people ask causal questions during a
wide range of information processing activities. In the pres-
ent paper, we investigate whether minimal social scenarios,
such as that described by John hugs Mary, lead people to
focus on the causes of those events. We examine if people
have a general preference for making causal inferences, and
if so whether they make backward looking causal infer-
ences to Wnd an antecedent for the event, or forward look-
ing causal inferences to Wnd a possible consequence.
Do people go beyond the information given?
In both the social psychology and psycholinguistic liter-
atures, there has been considerable interest in the patterns
of causality triggered by various types of interpersonal
verbs (see Rudolph & Försterling, 1997, for a review). In
these studies, participants are usually given an invitation to
complete a simple sentence fragment ending with a causal
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case, their continuations typically continue with he, refer-
ring to John, because they likely assume that John has done
something that caused him to fascinate Mary. In contrast, a
fragment such as John praised Mary becauseƒ typically
leads participants to continue with a reference to Mary,
because they likely assume that Mary has done something
praiseworthy. A considerable literature has catalogued this
implicit causality bias (e.g., Au, 1986; Brown & Fish, 1983;
Corrigan, 1988, 1992; Fiedler & Semin, 1988; Garvey &
Caramazza, 1974). Such studies assume that interpersonal
verbs invite spontaneous causal attribution. However, the
usual method of eliciting continuations has been to ask an
explicit causal question, or to ask participants to complete
a sentence fragment ending with “because.” Such tech-
niques do not answer the question of whether there is any
spontaneous tendency to make causal attributions.
According to one viewpoint, causal questions are not
generated for all events. The assumption being that infer-
ences are eVortful and the cognitive system limited, thereby
making it implausible that causal inferences are generated
ubiquitously. A representative statement capturing this
viewpoint comes from Weiner (1985) who surmized that
not all events will give rise to causal attribution since the
time and eVort to Wnd a cause “may place cognitive strain
on an organism” (Weiner, 1985, p. 82). This is not to say
causal inferences are never made. If there is an explicit
causal question (as in the implicit causality literature) then
causal activity will ensue. We refer to this as the motivated
tactician view (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Wyer & Srull, 1989);
causal inferences are made, but only when there is an
explicit goal.
Evidence for a preference for causal antecedents
Although making inferences may be cognitively expen-
sive, certain types of inferences play an essential role in our
thinking. Schank (1986) has argued that the fundamental
property of the cognitive system is its ability to explain its
own, and others’ actions. Attribution theories emphasize
that causal attributions underlie our behavior, cognition,
and emotion, and argue they are important for understand-
ing since being able to locate the causal antecedents of an
event helps predict what will happen in the future (e.g., C.
A. Anderson, 1991; Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1989; Kelley,
1967). According to this perspective, causal inferences con-
stitute a core part of everyday thinking.
There is considerable evidence that people make sponta-
neous causal antecedent attributions, without an explicit
causal question. Analyses of newspaper articles, for exam-
ple, have shown a wealth of causal explanations for a
diverse set of events, including sports events, political elec-
tions, and interpersonal events (as depicted in advice col-
umns) (Försterling & Groeneveld, 1983; Lau, 1984; Lau &
Russell, 1980; Shoenenman & Rubanowitz, 1983 as
reported in Weiner, 1985). Think-aloud protocols during
reading show that explanations are more common thanother kinds of inferences (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).
When a causal link is not made explicit in a text, then there
is an increase in reading time, during which readers make
inferences in order to connect the new text fragment to the
existing mental model in a causal fashion (e.g., Keenan,
Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Van den Broek, 1990; Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998).
Certain conditions particularly promote causal infer-
ences, including the occurrence of an unexpected or
unusual event, non-attainment of a goal, the dependence of
a perceiver on others for hedonically relevant outcomes,
and the perceiver’s own failure to perform a well-deWned
task satisfactorily (for overviews see Hastie, 1984; Kanaz-
awa, 1992; Weiner, 1985).
Evidence for a preference for causal consequents
The majority of research has focused on inferences to the
causal antecedent, but it is by no means obvious that there
is a general preference for antecedents. A preference for
causal consequences would be consistent with how much of
narrative is structured—consecutive sentences tend to
depict consecutive events (Chafe, 1979; Hopper, 1979). Sto-
ries by young children follow this default structure. A typi-
cal example is: “The baby cried. The mummy picked it up”
(as told by a 3-year-old girl, analyzed in Sacks, 1972, see
also Nelson, 1986). The second sentence in this story
reports on the consequence (what happens next) of the
main event depicted in the Wrst sentence. There is also a
processing advantage in adults for maintaining temporal
order between events. Participants are faster at verifying a
consequential relationship between two events (e.g., crime–
arrest) than an antecedent one (e.g., arrest–crime) (Fenker,
Waldmann, & Holyoak, 2005; see also Van der Meer,
Beyer, Heinze, & Badel, 2002; Zwaan, 1996).
Independently, Stevenson, Crawley, and Kleinman
(1994) suggested that, all things being equal, people have a
preference for information about the causal consequences
of an event. So, rather than generating inferences about
causal antecedents by default, they generate inferences
about causal consequences. The evidence for the claim
comes from a series of continuation studies, investigating
referent preference in language production. More recently,
Arnold (2001) presented participants with short passages
ending in a sentence with a physical transfer event (e.g.,
John sent a telegram to Mary), which they had to continue
with a new sentence. She found that there were more causal
consequence than causal antecedent continuations.
Evidence for massive inferential capacity
It could be that both causal antecedent and causal conse-
quence inferences are generated for social scenarios. Fiedler
and Semin (1988) have argued that in real language use sen-
tences are embedded in a set of antecedent and consequent
sentences, and so when participants are presented with a
sentence on its own they Wll in these antecedent and
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(e.g., Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002; Uleman, 1999;
Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Winter & Uleman,
1984) have argued that people are constantly making a
plethora of inferences: “People interpret the meaning of
events spontaneously as well as tactically, and go beyond
not only the information given, but also beyond the imme-
diate demands of their proximal goalsƒPeople are Xexible
interpreters and have at their disposal a whole repertoire of
cognitive procedures than they can deliberately deploy or
“put on automatic”” (Uleman et al., 1996, pp. 269–270).
This viewpoint has been dubbed the promiscuous inference
generation account (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997).
A central component of this framework has been to
show that people spontaneously (i.e., without intention,
awareness, or eVort) make inferences about many aspects
of an event, including inferences about the protagonists
such as their traits and emotional states (see Uleman, 1999).
For example, when presented with a sentence such as Anna
solved the mystery halfway through the book, participants
infer the trait clever, even when there is no explicit instruc-
tion to do so (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984). Similarly, peo-
ple are better at learning the association between an actor
and trait if they have previously been exposed to a descrip-
tion of the actor’s trait-implying behavior. This suggests
that the trait concept is activated during comprehension of
the behavioral statement (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994;
Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995).
Crucially, Uleman and colleagues have argued that there
is spontaneous generation of both causal antecedents and
causal consequences (e.g., Hassin et al., 2002; Uleman,
1999). Hassin et al. had people read sentences such as After
spending a day exploring beautiful sights in the crowded
streets of New York, Jane discovered that her wallet was
missing, and rate how interesting they were. This was fol-
lowed by a 5 minute Wller task, and then a surprise cued-
recall task for the sentences presented in the Wrst part of the
experiment. Cues were either implied causes (e.g., pick-
pocket) or words from the actual sentences (e.g., sights).
Hassin et al. found that implied causes were better cues for
retrieving the target sentences.
As evidence for causal consequence inferences being
generated spontaneously, Hassin et al. (2002) cite McKoon
and RatcliV (1986), who showed that on reading The direc-
tor and the cameraman were ready to shoot closeups when
suddenly the actress fell from the 14th story, participants
inferred dead, a causal consequence of the target sentence.1
They conclude “When taken together with the current Wnd-
1 The evidence for spontaneous inferences to causal consequences is ac-
tually very weak. The majority of research shows that such inferences are
either not made at all (e.g., Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993),
or are only made when the eliciting information is foregrounded, the infer-
ence is strongly constrained by the story context, and it resolves a coher-
ence break (Fincher-Kiefer, 1993; Keefe & McDaniel, 1993; Murray, Klin,
& Myers, 1993), or when the task strategically encourages such inferences
(Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, Castillo, & Schmalhofer, 2006).ings it seems, then, that the mind not only spontaneously
attached a “cause tag”—it also attaches an “eVect tag”,
hence, spontaneously covering the whole range of causal
relations” (Hassin et al., 2002, p. 520). Thus, it could be that
causal antecedent and causal consequence inferences are
equally likely to be drawn.
The present research
In this paper, we investigate whether minimal social sce-
narios trigger consistent patterns of inference. By a minimal
social scenario, we mean a single event with just two people,
presented in isolation without background information
(prior discourse). Examples are John hit Mary, John loved
Mary, and John sent a telegram to Mary. We investigated
inferences to these social scenarios using linguistic materi-
als. Participants were presented with short sentences and
asked to produce a written continuation. Asking people to
produce continuations from vignettes reXects how people
often think about social events, since much of social cogni-
tion is mediated through and with language (e.g., I. Ander-
son & Beattie, 1996). This is not to imply that all social
cognition is linguistically mediated, but clearly language
plays a substantial and crucial role. This is reXected in the
research paradigms employed in social psychology, where
people are typically asked to respond to linguistic materials,
and less often to real-life protagonists engaging in relevant
behaviors.
Continuation data are the best way to examine whether
there are consistent patterns of inference, since other mea-
sures (such as a probe task, for example) require the
researcher to determine not only what type of inference
people will make (causal antecedent or causal conse-
quence), but also what the content of that inference will be.
DiVerential reaction times could be due either to the type or
the content of the inference. Given our focus is on the type
of inferences people generate (regardless of content), open
continuations are preferable. They also do not presuppose
what particular inferences the participants will make.
What type of continuations might participants produce?
Here, it is potentially important that researchers suggesting
a preference for causal antecedents usually investigate
“interpersonal” events, depicting an action or state between
two people (e.g., Rudolph & Försterling, 1997), whereas
those arguing for a preference for causal consequences con-
centrate on events with little social signiWcance, such as
transfer of objects between people (e.g., Arnold, 2001; Ste-
venson et al., 1994). Thus we investigated whether diVer-
ences among the types of verbs (and events they depict)
may explain the diVerences in inferences generated, if there
are any.
The causal antecedent account predicts that all minimal
social scenarios will lead to inferences about possible ante-
cedents of that event; whereas the causal consequent
account predicts a general preference for consequences. The
predictions from the motivated tactician account and the
promiscuous inference generation account are less clear.
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the motivated tactician account does not predict diVerences
in the inferences generated. However, this account is silent
on whether causal antecedent or causal consequence infer-
ences would be favored. The promiscuous inference genera-
tion account suggests that both causal antecedent and
causal consequent inferences should be drawn for all
events. Thus it provides no reason to expect a diVerence
between the number of causal antecedent and causal conse-
quence continuations. A Wnal possibility is that diVerent
inferences are licensed by diVerent verbs. To our knowledge
there is no previous evidence suggesting that causal ante-
cedent and causal consequence inferences may be deter-
mined by verb-type, but there is other evidence that
suggests that this is a possibility. Most notably the work of
Fiedler and Semin (Fiedler, Semin, & Koppetsch, 1991;
Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1989, 1992) has shown that diVerent
verbs license diVerent inferences, such as how enduring an
event is, how much information it reveals about the subject
or about the situation, how easily the verb can be veriWed,
and so on. Thus, it is plausible that causal inference genera-
tion may be crucially linked to the type of verb: Interper-
sonal verbs may trigger causal inferences, whereas physical
transfer verbs may trigger consequential ones.
To distinguish these accounts, we began in Experiment 1
by asking participants to produce continuations to descrip-
tions of events using interpersonal verbs, such as John hit
Mary and John loved Mary, whereas in Experiment 2 we
presented participants with a diVerent kind of scenario, a
literal transfer event such as John gave a book to Mary. We
then examine what could be the basis for the kinds of infer-
ences people draw under each of these conditions. SpeciW-
cally, we examine the role of unusualness, the number of
participators in the event, and the linguistic formulation of
interpersonal events.
Experiment 1: Inferences to interpersonal events
Interpersonal events depict an action or state between at
least two people.2 In English, the default way of expressing
such relations is in a simple transitive sentence, such as
John hit Mary or John liked Mary. There are two main clas-
siWcatory systems used to describe interpersonal events:
The Thematic Role Taxonomy (Brown & Fish, 1983),
which is derived from psycholinguistics; and the Linguistic
Category Model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988), which is derived
from social cognition. Both systems are used in order to
account for which participator3 will receive causal attribu-
tion. For example, people judge the cause of John feared
2 In accord with social–psychological usage, event refers to both actions
and states; note that in linguistics and psycholinguistics it is used to refer
to actions exclusively.
3 We use participator to refer to any entity participating in an event, be it
a person or an object. The more common term used in the literature is par-
ticipant, but we avoid it here since participant is also used to refer to peo-
ple taking part in the experiment.Mary to be Mary, but the cause of John frightened Mary to
be John. Neither classiWcatory system predicts whether
causal antecedent inferences (instead of causal consequen-
tial ones) would be generated in the absence of an explicit
causal question. Nevertheless, we make use of the Thematic
Role Taxonomy in this paper in order to facilitate discus-
sion and make predictions about which classes of verbs
would trigger which kinds of inferences. Although the Lin-
guistic Category Model is superior in many ways, account-
ing for a wide array of social inferences from language not
accounted for by the other model (Fiedler et al., 1991;
Maass & Arcuri, 1992; Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1989, 1992),
we chose the Thematic Role Taxonomy because it has a
classiWcatory scheme better suited for transfer verbs dis-
cussed in later experiments.
In this experiment we selected 100 verbs depicting both
actions and states, and these are further divided into
smaller classes. The classes are identiWed based on the prop-
erties of the participators: An Agent is the instigator of an
action; a Patient is the recipient of the action; an Experi-
encer is someone having an experience; and Wnally a Stimu-
lus is someone, or something, giving rise to an experience.
Agent/Patient and Stimulus/Experiencer form exclusive
pairs of participator roles. Agent–Patient verbs depict
actions of various kinds (e.g., hug, telephone, praise),
whereas Stimulus–Experiencer verbs depict states. There
are two classes of state verbs: Stimulus–Experiencer verbs
(e.g., frighten, fascinate) and Experiencer–Stimulus verbs
(e.g., fear, respect). The diVerence between the two is
whether the subject of the sentence is the one giving rise to
the experience (Stimulus–Experiencer verbs) or having the
experience (Experiencer–Stimulus verbs). In this experi-
ment we test the prediction that these three classes of verbs
will lead to a preference for causal antecedents.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight University of Glasgow undergraduates par-
ticipated in this experiment. In all experiments, participants
were native speakers of English, and no-one took part in
more than one experiment reported in this paper.
Materials and design
A hundred verbs were randomly selected from a corpus
consisting of interpersonal verbs previously used in the lit-
erature on causal attribution or taken from Levin (1993).
There were 57 Agent–Patient verbs, 20 Stimulus–Experi-
encer verbs, and 23 Experiencer–Stimulus verbs, a distribu-
tion comparable to the actual frequency of such verbs in
English (Rudolph & Försterling, 1997). The verbs were ran-
domly divided into two lists with the constraint that each
list had roughly equal numbers of each sort of verb. Every
verb was paired with two proper names, one stereotypically
male and one stereotypically female, such as Ted loved
Mary (see Appendix A). Each sentence was presented with
a period and two blank lines. The ordering of the male and
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random presentation orders were used.
Procedure
Participants were tested either individually or in small
groups. Each participant received a booklet and was asked
to read each sentence and provide a continuation in the
space provided. They were told there was no right or wrong
answer.
Coding procedure
There were three main categories of response: causal
antecedent, causal consequence, and simple elaboration.
The categories reXect possible temporal focus points—to
the antecedent (i.e., the preceding event), to the conse-
quence (i.e., to the following event), or to the target event
itself. All remaining continuations were coded into a single
“other” category. Our primary interest is whether people
spontaneously focus on the causal antecedent or conse-
quence.
Causal antecedent. A continuation was coded as a causal
antecedent if it began with because (or an abbreviation such
as ’cause or ’coz). When it was not employed, the criterion
of “necessity in the circumstances” was used (Mackie, 1980;
see also Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Trabasso & Sperry,
1985; Trabasso & Vandenbroek, 1985). Judges coded a con-
tinuation as a causal antecedent if under the circumstances
the continuation had not happened then the event in the
main clause would not have happened. Examples of ante-
cedent continuations to John loved Mary were Because she
was so sweet, Cause of her personality and She was irresist-
ible.
Causal consequence. If the continuation began with so, or
some equivalent term (e.g., and so) then it was coded as a
causal consequence. If such a term was not used, we
reversed the criterion for identifying causal antecedent
relations. Following Trabasso and Sperry (1985, p. 598),
it was assumed that “the consequence is dependent in
some manner on the cause or that the cause determines
the consequence.” Hence, a continuation was deWned as
a causal consequence if under the circumstances the event
in the main clause had not happened then the continua-
tion would not have happened. Examples of causal
consequence continuations to John loved Mary were And
so he brought her Xowers and He could not live without
her. Continuations that reXected what happened next
were also coded in this category, for example continuing
John apologized to Mary with And then they went for
pizza.
Simple elaboration. A simple elaboration provided infor-
mation that modiWed the target event in some way. The
coders were instructed to code simple elaborations “if the
location or time the event happened or the manner in
which the event was carried out was mentioned.” Anexample of each type of continuation was also given to
the coder: John apologized to Mary in the garden (loca-
tion), John apologized to Mary in the morning (time), and
John apologized to Mary loudly (manner). If the continua-
tion introduced another participator (e.g., ’s friend, as in
John apologized to Mary’s friend) then the continuation
was also coded as a simple elaboration. Simple elabora-
tions do not introduce a new event, but rather provide
more information about the target event itself.
Two judges were given the coding criteria and then inde-
pendently coded the 2400 continuations. Cohen’s kappa
statistic was D .89, SE D .007, p < .0001 (Cohen, 1960),
almost perfect agreement according to Landis and Koch
(1977). Data from one judge were chosen by random for all
analyses for this experiment.
Results
Two analyses were conducted for each verb class, treat-
ing participants and items as random eVects. Items analy-
ses are typically used in experiments employing language
stimuli in order to demonstrate that the Wndings general-
ize beyond the particular items used in the current experi-
ment (Clark, 1973). The crucial question is whether causal
antecedent or causal consequence continuations were pre-
ferred for the three classes of verbs. To test this, we calcu-
lated for each participant how many continuations were
produced to the causal antecedent and how many to the
consequent; for items we followed the same procedure,
calculating for each item how many antecedent and con-
sequent continuations were elicited.
In all analyses there were signiWcantly more causal
antecedent continuations than causal consequent ones:
Agent–Patient verbs Wilcoxon-T: participants z D 5.73,
p < .0001; items z D 6.00, p < .0001; Stimulus–Experiencer
verbs Wilcoxon-T: participants z D 5.61, p < .0001; items
z D 3.89, p < .0001 and Experiencer–Stimulus verbs Wilco-
xon-T: participants z D 4.59, p < .0001; items z D 3.83,
p < .0001. The percentage of continuations to each of the
categories is shown in Table 1 (see also Fig. 1a). Causal
antecedent continuations accounted for 75.9% of the data
overall.
Table 1










(e.g., Barry hugged Joan)
71.5 17.7 9.9 0.9
Stimulus–Experiencer 
(e.g., Gail frightened 
Matthew)
86.0 10.6 2.3 1.1
Experiencer–Stimulus 
(e.g., Florence feared 
Sebastian)
70.3 16.7 12.1 0.9
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Causal antecedent completions were overwhelmingly
preferred to all other types of continuations. For all three
verb types, participants focused on the event that brought
about the target event. This is consistent with the hypothe-
ses that interpersonal verbs in particular put an emphasis
on causal antecedents, and that there is a general preference
for antecedents.
Experiment 1 is inconsistent with the view that there is a
general preference for causal consequences as suggested by
Stevenson et al. (1994) and seems to be at odds with the
empirical Wndings presented by Arnold (2001). We consider
two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, events
depicting interpersonal events may simply lead to more
causal antecedent continuations than other types of verb.
Arnold exclusively used verbs depicting physical transfer
events (e.g., John got a ball from Mary), where an object (aball) is transferred from a Goal (John) to a Source (Mary).4
It could be that these verbs do not elicit causal antecedent
inferences, but rather causal consequence ones.
Second, Arnold’s (2001) materials were more complex
than those in Experiment 1. Rather than use single sen-
tences, she set her sentences in fuller passages. It could be
that this prior context provided people with causal anteced-
ent information, which meant that participants no longer
focused on the antecedent as they had been provided with
that information. If causal antecedent information was
already provided, participants might then focus on a causal
consequence relation (i.e., what happened next). In Experi-
ment 2, we stripped away the contextual support from
4 Like states, physical transfer events can vary in their syntactic struc-
ture, with the Goal either occurring as the sentence subject in Goal–Source
verbs (e.g., get, catch, receive) or as the object in Source–Goal verbs (e.g.,
pass, tell, give).Fig. 1. Continuations to Experiment 1 (A), Experiment 2 (B), Experiment 4 (C), and Experiment 5 (D).
John hugged Mary John got a ticket from Mary
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conditions comparable to our Experiment 1, the focus on
causal consequences still emerges in continuations.
Experiment 2: Inferences to physical transfer events
Method
Participants
Twenty-four further University of Glasgow undergraduates
participated in this experiment. One of the participants did not
complete the booklet and so was not included in the analyses.
Materials and design
The materials were taken from Arnold (2001). We used
the target sentence exactly as it appeared in the Appendix
of Arnold (Appendix B) . Each item consisted of a physical
transfer verb, introduced by either a Goal–Source verb (e.g.,
John got a ticket from Mary) or a Source–Goal verb (e.g.,
John passed the ball to Mary). Each verb was paired with a
stereotypically male and a stereotypically female proper
name. As in Experiment 1, the order of the names was
counterbalanced across booklets. A total of 32 items were
presented to each participant. We presented the items in six
diVerent random orders.
Procedure
This was the same as Experiment 1.
Coding
The responses were coded and analyzed as before. The
measure of agreement between the two judges was almost
perfect, D .84, SE D .02, p < .0001. Disagreements were
resolved through discussion.
Results
We examined the number of causal antecedent and
causal consequent continuations produced for the two
types of verbs, using participant and item level analyses.
Both Goal–Source and Source–Goal verbs gave rise to sig-
niWcantly more causal consequent continuations then ante-
cedent ones: Goal–Source Wilcoxon-T: participants
z D 3.64, p < .0001; items z D 3.53, p < .0001 and Source–
Goal Wilcoxon-T: participants z D 4.03, p < .0001; items
z D 3.52, p < .0001. Table 2 shows the percentage of continu-
ations to each category (see also Fig. 1b). Overall 70.1% of
continuations were to causal consequents.
Discussion
For physical transfer verbs expressed by both Goal–
Source and Source–Goal verbs, causal consequence comple-
tions were the most frequent. This is consistent with the Wnd-
ings of Arnold (2001), and our manipulation showed that the
extra context provided by Arnold was not the reason for the
diVerence between her observations and those found in ourExperiment 1. The preference for causal consequence contin-
uations suggests that verbs denoting the transfer of physical
objects puts a focus on what happens next, with or without
prior discourse (as provided by Arnold).
One explanation for the lack of causal antecedent con-
tinuations in Experiment 2 could be that the materials
depict events that are more commonplace than those
depicted in Experiment 1. There is reason to think that
unusual events trigger search for causal antecedents (Has-
tie, 1984; Kanazawa, 1992; Schank, 1986; Weiner, 1985).
For instance, Hilton and Slugoski (1986) demonstrated that
deviations from scripted events, for example Mary buys
nothing on her visit to the supermarket, lead to causal attri-
butions because they deny presuppositions about usual
behavior in supermarkets. Similarly, where participator
roles are unusual, as in The son praised the father, more
causal attributions are elicited than when the roles are more
usual, as in The father praised the son (Garvey & Caram-
azza, 1974). It is possible that the interpersonal events in
Experiment 1 (e.g., John hit Mary) may be more unusual
than simple physical transfer events in Experiment 2 (e.g.,
John gave a book to Mary). We tested this possibility in
Experiment 3 by asking participants to rate the events from
Experiments 1 and 2 for unusualness.




Twenty-four University of Glasgow undergraduates
participated in this experiment.
Materials and design
All verbs from Experiments 1 to 2 were included in the rat-
ing study: Fifty-seven Agent–Patient verbs, 20 Stimulus–
Experiencer verbs, and 23 Experiencer–Stimulus verbs from
Experiment 1; and 16 Goal–Source and 16 Source–Goal
verbs from Experiment 2. The verbs were presented as before
with stereotypically male and female names, and the order of
the names was counterbalanced across booklets. Each item
was followed by a 10cm long rating scale with “extremely
unusual” marked on one end, and “not at all unusual” at the
other. Items were presented in four diVerent random orders.
Table 2










(e.g., Jason passed 
the ball to Holly)
19.0 64.9 12.5 3.5
Source–Goal 
(e.g., Gabrielle got a
ticket from Rafael)
15.8 75.3 7.1 1.9
A. Majid et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 918–932 925Procedure
Participants received a booklet and were asked to read
each sentence carefully and then mark on the scale beneath
how unusual the event was. They were told all judgments
were relative to one another, and that they should use the
full range of the scale. Participants’ responses were mea-
sured to the nearest millimeter, with 0 meaning that the
event was judged to be extremely unusual and 100 that it
was judged to be not at all unusual.
Results and discussion
In order to test whether the interpersonal events of
Experiment 1 were more unusual than the physical transfer
events of Experiment 2, we compared the unusualness rat-
ings and found a large eVect of event type [t(130) D 4.90,
p < .0001, d D .86]. Interpersonal events were rated as more
unusual (M D 67.2) than physical transfer events
(M D 83.5), as predicted.
To test more directly the relationship between unusual-
ness of the event and causal antecedent continuations, we
correlated the ratings from this study with the frequency of
causal antecedent continuations from Experiments 1 and 2.
There was a signiWcant negative correlation [r (130) D ¡.42,
p < .0001] between unusualness ratings (M D 60.9) and
causal continuations (M D 17.9). That is, the more unusual
an event was rated to be, the more causal antecedent con-
tinuations it received. Thus unusualness appears to play a
role in whether a causal question is asked, and accounts for
around 18% of the variance. However, this relationship is
stronger for interpersonal verbs than transfer verbs. Sepa-
rate correlations by verb type show that there was a signiW-
cant negative correlation [r (98) D ¡.34, p < .0001] between
unusualness ratings (M D 67.2) and causal antecedent con-
tinuations (M D 21.6) for interpersonal verbs, but no signiW-
cant relationship [r (30) D ¡.11, p D .29] between
unusualness (M D 83.5) and causal continuations (M D 4.0)
for transfer verbs. It is diYcult to interpret this lack of cor-
relation, since at D .05 and N D 32 the power for detecting
an eVect for the transfer verbs is only .15 (Faul & Erdfelder,
1992).
Overall, the more unusual an event was deemed to be,
the more likely it was to elicit a causal antecedent continu-
ation. A substantial portion of the variance was
accounted for by unusualness, suggesting that people tend
to focus on causal antecedents when events are unusual.
Perceived unusualness is one factor that might explain
why events based on interpersonal verbs tend to induce
causal antecedent continuations. However, there are other
diVerences between transfer verbs and interpersonal
verbs. First, transfer verbs describe events involving three
participators. For instance, John got a ticket from Mary
has John, Mary, and a ticket. In contrast, the interper-
sonal verbs studied in Experiment 1 describe events
involving only two participators. Perhaps number of par-
ticipators changes the pattern of continuations. We exam-




Twenty-four University of Edinburgh undergraduates
participated.
Materials and design
The materials were the same as those in Experiment 2,
but were missing the prepositional phrase (to or from plus
the name). An example is Frank sold the couch (see Appen-
dix B). Half the items had a stereotypically male name, the
other half had a stereotypically female name. A total of 32
items were presented to each participant. Items were pre-
sented in six diVerent random orders.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
Coding
The measure of agreement between the two judges was
almost perfect, D .83, SE D .01, p < .0001. Disagreements
were resolved through discussion.
Results
The question of interest is whether there is a preference
for causal antecedent or causal consequence continuations.
If verbs with two participators trigger a search for a causal
antecedent then we would expect more causal antecedent
continuations. On the other hand, if the type of event is cru-
cial, then we would expect more causal consequence contin-
uations. For both Goal–Source and Source–Goal verbs, we
conducted participant and item analyses to compare the
number of continuations produced to causal antecedents
and consequents.
It appears that number of participators is not crucial for
the type of inference made. Causal consequence continua-
tions were produced signiWcantly more often than causal
antecedent continuations for both Goal–Source verbs Wil-
coxon-T: participants z D 4.30, p < .0001; items z D 3.52,
p < .0001 and Source–Goal verbs Wilcoxon-T: participants
z D 4.29, p < .0001; items z D 3.52, p < .0001. Overall 71.2% of
continuations were to consequences. The proportion of
continuations to each of the categories is shown in Table 3
(see Fig. 1c).
Discussion
We hypothesized that number of participators could be
a crucial variable underlying the preference for causal ante-
cedents displayed in Experiment 1 on the one hand, and the
preference for causal consequences in Experiment 2 on the
other hand. In this experiment, verbs from Experiment 2
were presented to participants with one participator omitted,
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participants produced more causal consequence continua-
tions than any other kind of relation, and the results were
almost identical to those of Experiment 2 where all three
participators were present. It seems that number of partici-
pators is not a determinant of continuation type.
Another possibility is that continuations are determined
by event type: Interpersonal events focus attention on
causal antecedents, but transfer events focus attention on
causal consequences. To investigate this possibility, we Wrst
note that Goal–Source type verbs, such as get, receive, pass,
and toss, can be used to depict physical transfer (e.g., got a
ticket, received a telegram, passed the ball, tossed the egg),
but they can also be used metaphorically to depict an inter-
personal scenario. For example, got a hug, received praise,
passed the blame, and tossed a kiss do not describe a literal
transfer. People understand these expressions as referring
to interpersonal scenarios, akin to those expressed in
Experiment 1. Hence in Experiment 5 we asked whether
sentences such as John got a hug from Mary produce causal
antecedent continuations, as do sentences such as John
hugged Mary, or causal consequence continuations, as do
sentences such as John got a ticket from Mary.
Experiment 5: Inferences to metaphorical transfer events
In Experiment 3 we saw that interpersonal events were
deemed to be more unusual than physical transfer events.
This unusualness may reXect something deep about the
kinds of interactions that trigger causal antecedent infer-
ences: Interpersonal events depict interactions that are
more noteworthy; whereas transfer events seem mundane.
However, we can take the verbs used to depict transfer
events, and make them depict events that are interpersonal.
The metaphorical expression sent conXicting signals, for
instance, represents a state aVairs between two people that
is socially loaded. Do such expressions trigger causal ante-
cedent inferences because of their interpersonal status, or
causal consequence completions because of the use of the
verb sent (as in sent a telegram)?
We took the verbs used in Experiment 2 and changed the
direct object (the object of transfer) so that the new expres-
sion depicted an interpersonal event, akin to those pre-
sented in Experiment 1. Some of these expressions have no
direct counterpart in Experiment 1 (e.g., there is no single
Table 3










(e.g., Jason passed 
a ball)
13.8 67.7 15.6 2.9
Source–Goal
(e.g., Gabrielle got 
a ticket)
9.4 75.8 9.6 5.2verb which means sent conXicting signals), and others were a
paraphrase of a simpler expression from Experiment 1
(John hugged Mary from Experiment 1 can be paraphrased
as John got a hug from Mary).
If the interpersonal scenario is crucial to determining
patterns of inferences, then John got a hug from Mary
should lead to causal antecedent continuations, as did sen-
tences like John hugged Mary. However, if the speciWc verb
is critical then causal consequence continuations should
predominate for John got a hug from Mary as they did for
John got a ticket from Mary.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four University of Glasgow undergraduates
participated.
Materials and design
The materials were adapted from Experiment 2. The
direct object was changed so that the object of transfer was
not a physical object, but an abstract object. This changed
the event into a metaphorical expression depicting an inter-
personal event (see Appendix C). Items were presented with
male and female names. A total of 29 items were created
with 14 Goal–Source verbs and 15 Source–Goal verbs. (It
was not possible to substitute abstract objects for every
transfer event used in Experiment 2.) We conducted an
unusualness rating study of these events (as in Experiment
3) comparing the new expressions with the equivalent
Goal–Source verbs from Experiment 2 (e.g., between Rafael
got a ticket from Gabrielle and Rafael got a hug from Gabri-
elle). Numerically there were slightly higher ratings of
unusualness for simple transfer events, such as got a ticket
(M D 64.9), than there were for interpersonal transfer
events, such as got a hug (M D 60.5), but this was not statis-
tically signiWcant [t(56) D 1.26, p D .22].
Procedure
The procedure was as in Experiment 1.
Coding
The measure of agreement between the two judges was
substantial, D .77, SE D .02, p < .0001. Disagreements were
resolved through discussion.
Results and discussion
If interpersonal events trigger causal antecedent attribu-
tions then there should be more causal antecedent continu-
ations than causal consequence ones. On the other hand, if
the speciWc verb is the crucial variable, then there should be
more causal consequence continuations. For each verb
class we conducted participant and item analyses compar-
ing the number of continuations to both antecedents and
consequences. There were signiWcantly more causal conse-
quence continuations produced than causal antecedent
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z D 3.01, p < .003; items z D 2.38, p < .02, and for Source–
Goal verbs Wilcoxon-T: participants z D 2.41, p < .02; items
z D 2.70, p < .007. Overall 61.3% of continuations were to
causal consequences. The proportion of continuations to
each of the categories is shown in Table 4 (see Fig. 1d).
Metaphorical transfer depicting an interpersonal event
led to more causal consequence continuations than causal
antecedent ones. This suggests that the type of verb is more
important than the particular scenario depicted. In other
words, the type of verb, rather than the type of scenario,
appears to predict the type of continuation. However, does
the type of scenario have any eVect on continuations?
Our question was whether changing the type of transfer,
from a physical one to a metaphorical one depicting an
interpersonal event, would increase the number of causal
antecedent continuations. Although causal consequence
completions were still strongly preferred for abstract trans-
fer events, we can still examine whether there was a boost to
the causal antecedent continuations by comparing the con-
tinuations in this experiment to those in Experiment 2.
Thus, we can directly compare continuations to sentences
such as Rafael got a ticket from Gabrielle and Rafael got a
hug from Gabrielle. A between-participants and -items com-
parison showed that causal antecedent continuations in the
current experiment increased signiWcantly in comparison to
antecedent continuations in Experiment 2 in both the par-
ticipants analysis t(92) D 2.93, p < .004, d D .58 and the items
analysis t(59) D 3.93, p < .0001, d D .92 (Experiment 2,
M D 2.78; Experiment 5, M D 4.54). This suggests that there
is an eVect of the interpersonal scenario that bolsters causal
antecedent continuations. Note that this eVect is not due to
unusualness as we controlled for this in our construction of
these materials.
General discussion
In this paper, we present evidence that even in the
absence of an explicit question, inferences generated by
people are systematically related to the input. When faced
with descriptions of simple, interpersonal and socially sig-
niWcant acts, such as John hugged Mary, people overwhelm-
ingly make causal antecedent attributions. However, when
presented with other acts, for example physical transfer
events such as John gave a book to Mary, the preference for
Table 4
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(e.g., Jason passed 
the blame to Holly)
30.6 60.7 4.5 4.2
Source–Goal 
(e.g., Gabrielle got
a hug from Rafael)
31.9 61.9 1.1 5.0antecedents disappears, and instead there is a strong prefer-
ence for causal consequences. These Wndings are inconsis-
tent with the motivated tactician view (Fiske & Taylor,
1991; Wyer & Srull, 1989), which proposes that people only
make inferences when there is some explicit goal to do so.
In these experiments instructions were held constant, and
yet people systematically favored causal antecedent infer-
ences in one case and causal consequence inferences in the
other.
These Wndings are also inconsistent with the view that
the cognitive system has a ubiquitous preference for causal
antecedents, as is supposed in much cognitive science (e.g.,
Schank, 1986), social cognition (e.g., Heider, 1958; Kelley,
1967), and text comprehension research (e.g., Graesser,
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). We show that this is not a gen-
eral preference, as has been presupposed, but instead the
focus of attention is shaped by the particular linguistic
utterance under consideration. Similarly, the Wndings are
inconsistent with the view that there is a general preference
for causal consequences, as is supposed in much psycholin-
guistic research (e.g., Arnold, 2001; Stevenson et al., 1994).
Interpersonal verbs predominantly gave rise to causal ante-
cedent continuations, not consequences as is predicted by
this view.
Finally, our results suggest that not all inferences are
equally likely to be generated, as suggested by the promis-
cuous inference generation account, or at least they are
not equally likely to make it to consciousness. Hassin
et al., (2002; Uleman, 1999) suggested that on reading an
event the whole range of causal relations are spontane-
ously generated, including both the causal antecedent and
the causal consequence. Our Wndings suggest that there is
diVerential activation of causal antecedent and causal
consequence inferences as a function of the verb. Our
studies do not address the time course of this inferential
activity—it could be that both types of inferences are
equally available early on, but one wins out over time; or
alternatively there could be a preference for causal ante-
cedents or causal consequences immediately on encoun-
tering the verb. It remains to future research to
distinguish these possibilities.
What underlies the preferences for causal antecedents or 
causal consequences?
Why are causal antecedent questions asked for some
sorts of events, but causal consequence questions for oth-
ers? (See Fig. 1.) We consider some possible explanations
below. Potential explanations are unusualness, the number
of participators, and the socialness of the scenario. We
argue that none of these can account for the essential diVer-
ence in continuations. Instead it seems that it is the verb
itself that determines whether a causal antecedent or a
causal consequence will be inferred. Two likely mechanisms
are the morphology of the verb as reXected in trait-impli-
cating derived adjectives, and the grammatical construction
that the verb forms part of.
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Part of the answer seems to lie in properties of the events
themselves, such as how unusual they are. It is well-estab-
lished that unusual scenarios or unusual participators can
lead to more inferences to the causal antecedent (Garvey &
Caramazza, 1974; Hastie, 1984; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986;
Kanazawa, 1992; Schank, 1986; Weiner, 1985). In Experi-
ment 3 we showed that participants view scenarios such as
John hugged Mary as more unusual than John gave a book
to Mary. This suggests that expectancies about unusualness
can trigger inferences to the causal antecedent. But unusu-
alness is only one component in accounting for continua-
tion types. More importantly Experiment 3 does not rule
out a diVerent possibility, namely that the unusualness rat-
ings are a result of whether an antecedent inference is likely
to be generated by the scenario presented, rather than the
other way round.
Number of participators
Another diVerence between events that generate causal
antecedent inferences and those that generate causal conse-
quence ones is the number of participators in the activity.
Interpersonal verbs are associated with two participators
(e.g., John hugged Mary), and gave rise to causal antecedent
continuations. This was the case regardless of whether the
two participator verbs were actions (hug) or states (love),
and whether the Experiencer was the subject (fear) or
object (frighten) of the sentence. Transfer verbs include
three participators (e.g., John got a ticket from Mary), and
gave rise to causal consequence inferences, regardless of
whether the Goal of the transfer was the subject (got) or the
object (pass). This raises the possibility that number of par-
ticipators is the crucial diVerence between eliciting causal
antecedent and causal consequence inferences. To test this,
we presented Goal–Source verbs with only two participa-
tors (e.g., John got a ticket instead of John got a ticket from
Mary). When presented with only two participators conse-
quence continuations were still overwhelmingly preferred.
This suggests that number of explicitly mentioned partici-
pators is not the crucial variable.
Socialness of scenario
A third diVerence between the events that triggered
causal antecedent inferences and those that triggered causal
consequence inferences was the nature of the event itself.
Experiment 1 consisted of sentences that depicted an inter-
personal scenario, whereas Experiment 2 depicted physical
transfer scenarios. To test whether socialness of scenario
was critical, in Experiment 5 we transformed the simple
transfer scenarios, such as John got a ticket from Mary, into
interpersonal ones, such as John got a hug from Mary. We
found that people tended to produce causal consequence
continuations rather than causal antecedent ones, as would
be expected if inferences were being triggered by the sce-
nario-type. One interpretation of this Wnding is that infer-
ences are being generated based on the literal meaning of
the verbs: The meaning of hug triggers causal antecedentinferences but the meaning of got triggers causal conse-
quence inferences. This does not Wt very well with the data
as the interpretation of the sentences of Experiment 5 does
not depend on the literal meaning of got—there is no actual
transfer taking place. Rather than the meaning of the verb,
other properties of the verbs may be responsible for the
diVerent patterns of attribution. One candidate is whether
the verb has associated with it a derived adjective.
Derived adjectives and causal antecedent inferences
In their seminal paper on the implicit causality bias,
Brown and Fish (1983) noted that people tend to attribute
cause to that participator that has a derived adjective asso-
ciated with it. For example, in Ted helps Paul the adjective
helpful can be derived from help, and would be a trait
attributable to Ted; thus when people make a causal attri-
bution to Ted helps Paul, it is to Ted. Brown and Fish, and
later HoVman and Tchir (1990), found that people were
more likely to attribute causation to the participator that
had a derived adjective associated with it. This suggests a
diVerent explanation for the Wndings that interpersonal
verbs elicit inferences about the causal antecedent and
transfer verbs elicit inferences about the causal consequent.
Perhaps the interpersonal verbs have more derived adjec-
tives associated with the participators than the transfer
verbs do. If interpersonal verbs are more likely to have a
derived adjective associated with them, then they may be
more strongly trait implying, and thus more likely to be
associated with the causal antecedent.
In order to test this possibility, we conducted a corpus
search for derived adjectives associated with the 128 diVer-
ent verbs used in Experiments 1–5. We counted all derived
adjectives that could plausibly be used to refer to one of the
participators in the event using the CELEX Lexical Data-
base (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers 1995). There were
signiWcantly more adjectives associated with interpersonal
verbs (M D 1.1) than transfer verbs (M D 0.6), t(127) D 2.47,
p < .02, d D .63. This is consistent with the proposal that the
morphology of the verbs (i.e., whether there is a derived
adjective) makes trait implying information more available
for interpersonal verbs than for transfer verbs, thus making
inferences to causal antecedents for the former set of verbs
more likely. But there are some problems with this view.
It has been argued that activation of traits do not
require a prior causal inference to have been made, but
rather that trait inferences are a simple summary of behav-
ioral or personality information (Hamilton, 1998). To take
an example from Hamilton, if someone at a party is social-
izing with lots of people and I conclude that the person is
friendly, I am not attempting to explain why that person is
talking to people, but am merely summarizing a pattern of
behavior. However, once activated, trait information can
be used as the basis for further causal inferencing. Note
that the causal inference drawn from a trait term could be
to the antecedent or the consequent: John could be charm-
ing because he charmed Mary, or as a consequence of this
charming Mary.
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has a productive morphological process which allows a
range of suYxes (e.g., -er, -ing, -able/-ible) to be applied to
verbs to form adjectives. The fact that some derived adjec-
tives are more likely to occur could be due to some other
variable. For instance, the larger number of derived adjec-
tives associated with the interpersonal verbs could be pre-
cisely because these are more likely to receive causal
antecedent inferences. Other evidence suggest that trait
inferences and causal inferences are mediated by diVerent
processes (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Hilton, Smith, & Kim,
1995; Semin & Marsman, 1994). Overall, the link between
the existence of derived adjectives and likelihood of a
causal antecedent inference being generated remains specu-
lative.
Verb constructions
Since the literal meaning of the verb is not the central
variable in determining whether causal antecedent or causal
consequence inferences are generated, a structural variable
is implicated. We suggest that the abstract meaning associ-
ated with the construction is responsible for the diVerence
in inference type. Goldberg (1995, 2003) showed that par-
ticular constructions like X verb Y to/from Z have a seman-
tics associated with them, just like speciWc verbs do. This
construction has a transfer meaning associated with it,
regardless of the verb used to instantiate it.
Evidence for this comes from studies in which novel
verbs are used in diVerent constructions (e.g., Fisher, 1994;
Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000). For example, Kaschak and
Glenberg (2000) presented participants with sentences that
had innovative denominal verbs (i.e., verbs that are created
from nouns). For instance, the verb to crutch can be created
from the noun crutch, as in Lyn crutched Tom her apple so
he wouldn’t starve or Lyn crutched her apple so Tom
wouldn’t starve. Kaschak and Glenberg found that partici-
pants were more likely to interpret Lyn crutched Tom her
apple to mean Lyn transferred the apple to Tom using her
crutch than they were to Lyn crutched her apple, even
though both of them use the same innovative verb. This is
evidence that the construction provides the transfer mean-
ing. The transfer meaning also remains regardless of
whether the verb is used literally to refer to a physical trans-
fer event (as in Experiment 2) or metaphorically to refer to
an interpersonal event (as in Experiment 5). It also does not
matter if one of the participators is omitted (as in Experi-
ment 4). We suggest that this underlying notion of transfer
focuses attention on what happens next, and thus partici-
pants produce more causal consequence continuations.
Methodological considerations
A Wnal methodological point that follows from these
studies is that researchers must consider how they are for-
mulating social scenarios when examining causal inferences.
Not just scenario-type, but also how the scenario-type is
conveyed aVects exactly what sorts of inferences are mostlikely to be considered. The prevalence of inferences to the
causal antecedent in much of the literature may reXect
choice of linguistic materials, rather than a general prefer-
ence of the cognitive system. However it should be noted
that sampling of interpersonal verbs rather than other sorts
of verbs could be due to the prevalence of such verbs in the
language—perhaps there are more of these sorts of verbs
because causal antecedents tend to be more salient.
Conclusion
To summarize, the cognitive system does not appear to
favor inferences to the causal antecedent or causal conse-
quence blindly. Instead inferences are systematically related
to the speciWc input. We show that a particularly strong cue
to which inferences are generated is the particular verb
used: If a speaker wants her addressee to entertain causal
antecedents she should used a simple sentence such as John
hugged Mary; but if she wants to focus her addresses atten-
tion to what happened next she should instead use a diVer-
ent formulation, such as John gave Mary a hug. Thus, it is
not social scenarios per se that determine the kinds of infer-
ences we make, but the scenario in combination with the
particular linguistic formulation that is crucial.
Appendix A. Experimental materials for Experiment 1
1. Simon answered Anna.
2. Beryl applauded John.
3. Mick calmed down Carol.
4. Trevor censured Caroline.
5. Thomas criticised Debbie.
6. Fraser healed Jean.
7. Arnold helped Jennifer.
8. Liz judged Stephen.
9. Jonathan obeyed Nicola.
10. Rita placated Paul.
11. Paul praised Rita.
12. Ruth reassured Terrence.
13. Bob reprimanded Sally.
14. Amy accepted Ian.
15. Ian accused Amy.
16. Anna agreed with Simon.
17. John approached Beryl.
18. Beth bantered with Rob.
19. Carol betrayed Mick.
20. Caroline chased Trevor.
21. Michael cheated Catherine.
22. Catherine cheered Michael.
23. Derek cheered up Charlotte.
24. Charlotte commanded Derek.
25. Gordon competed with Claire.
26. Claire conWded in Gordon.
27. Diana deWed Craig.
28. Craig denounced Diana.
29. Keith derided Donna.
30. Elizabeth discouraged Tony.
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32. Matthew Xattered Gail.
33. Gemma greeted Adam.
34. Jane harassed Ted.
35. Ted harmed Jane.
36. Jennifer hit Arnold.
37. Barry hugged Joan.
38. Joan hurt Barry.
39. Kate insulted Donald.
40. Donald interrupted Kate.
41. Stephen joked with Liz.
42. Lorna kicked Henry.
43. Henry killed Lorna.
44. Meg manipulated Bruce.
45. Nancy murdered Roy.
46. Pamela ordered around Philip.
47. Rose protected Peter.
48. Peter pushed Rose.
49. Samantha restricted Noel.
50. Sandra rushed to Grant.
51. Sue slandered Luke.
52. Luke snubbed Sue.
53. Jack stared at Susan.
54. Susan stopped by Jack.
55. Suzanne supported Richard.
56. Theresa tied up David.
57. Veronica warned Callum.
58. Barbara appalled James.
59. James appeased Barbara.
60. Rob attracted Beth.
61. Debbie daunted Thomas.
62. Jake distracted Ellen.
63. Emma embarrassed Alan.
64. Sebastian fascinated Florence.
65. Gail frightened Matthew.
66. Patrick impressed Joyce.
67. Douglas intrigued Kathy.
68. Kathy irritated Douglas.
69. Nicola obsessed Jonathan.
70. Philip oVended Pamela.
71. Ray overexcited Rachel.
72. Andrew shamed Sarah.
73. Sarah shocked Andrew.
74. Richard terriWed Suzanne.
75. David troubled Theresa.
76. Tracy uplifted Edward.
77. Callum worried Veronica.
78. Graeme admired Ann.
79. Ann adored Graeme.
80. Donna desired Keith.
81. Eileen despised Kevin.
82. Kevin detested Eileen.
83. Tony disliked Elizabeth.
84. Ellen distrusted Jake.
85. Emily doted on Daniel.
86. Daniel dreaded Emily.
87. Florence feared Sebastian.88. Adam gaped at Gemma.
89. Jean hated Fraser.
90. Joyce identiWed Patrick.
91. Mary liked Charles.
92. Charles loathed Mary.
93. Bruce loved Meg.
94. Roy noticed Nancy.
95. Rachel pitied Ray.
96. Terrence recognised Ruth.
97. Sally resented Bob.
98. Noel respected Samantha.
99. Grant saw Sandra.
100. Edward trusted Tracy.
Notes: Items 1–57 are Agent–Patient verbs, items 58–80
Stimulus–Experiencer verbs, and items 81–100 are Experi-
encer–Stimulus verbs.
Appendix B. Experimental materials for Experiments 2 
and 4
1. Eduardo caught a cold [from Marguerite].
2. Scott caught a ride [from Annette].
3. Gabrielle got a ticket [from Rafael].
4. Carlos got three emails [from Gladys].
5. Claire received a telegram [from Juan].
6. Pablo heard the news [from Jennifer].
7. Allen learned the steps [from Sonia].
8. Art borrowed the notes [from Elizabeth].
9. Bruce accepted an invitation [from Courtney].
10. Pam took some lessons [from Craig].
11. Ed grabbed the megaphone [from Blair].
12. Linda snatched the candy [from Greg].
13. Victor rented a bicycle [from Mimi].
14. Christine inherited big feet [from Nick].
15. Barb purchased a painting [from Dan].
16. Delia bought a stereo [from Ryan].
17. Ginny threw the ball [to Fred].
18. Stacy handed the report [to Christopher].
19. Cathy tossed the egg [to Brett].
20. Bill sent an invitation [to Erin].
21. Rick told the story [to Marie].
22. Jason passed the ball [to Holly].
23. Matt oVered the slot [to Tina].
24. Andy rented the house [to Eloise].
25. Wiley loaned a barbecue [to Phyllis].
26. Mike taught a sonata [to Melora].
27. Sean taught the lambada [to Cynthia].
28. Ali brought Xowers [to Sam].
29. Brendan gave the pie [to Lisa].
30. Frank sold the couch [to Anna].
31. Betty showed a Van Gough [to Ray].
32. Emily paid $200 [to Phil].
Notes: Items 1–16 are Goal–Source verbs, and items 17–
32 are Source–Goal verbs. Words in square brackets were
omitted in Experiment 4.
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1. Marguerite caught a glance from Eduardo.
2. Annette caught a whiV from Scott.
3. Rafael got a hug from Gabrielle.
4. Gladys got respect from Carlos.
5. Juan received praise from Claire.
6. Jennifer heard a rumor from Pablo.
7. Sonia learned a language from Allen.
8. Courtney accepted a compliment from Bruce.
9. Craig took abuse from Pam.
10. Blair grabbed the limelight from Ed.
11. Greg snatched a kiss from Linda.
12. Nick inherited patience from Christine.
13. Dan purchased loyalty from Barb.
14. Ryan bought sex from Delia.
15. Fred threw a glance to Ginny.
16. Christopher handed the Xoor to Stacy.
17. Brett tossed a kiss to Cathy.
18. Erin sent conXicting signals to Bill.
19. Marie told a secret to Rick.
20. Holly passed the blame to Jason.
21. Tina oVered support to Matt.
22. Phyllis lent a hand to Wiley.
23. Melora taught the technique to Mike.
24. Cynthia taught manners to Sean.
25. Sam brought joy to Ali.
26. Lisa gave pleasure to Brendan.
27. Anna sold the idea to Frank.
28. Ray showed kindness to Betty.
29. Phil paid attention to Emily.
Notes: Items 1–14 are Goal–Source verbs, and items
15–29 are Source–Goal verbs.
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